Abstract. EPP (energy efficiency power plant) is a kind of "virtual power plant", pointing to reduce power consumption and carbon emission by a series of energy-saving measures in a region. The benefits and strategies of government and enterprises influence the effect of implementing EPP, and game analysis is an effective method to analyze this matter. In this paper, an evolutionary game model between government and enterprise implementing EPP considering carbon emission right trading is built, and the model's stability and evolution paths are analyzed; then Matlab software is used to simulate the impact from sensitivity of some important parameters; at last a calculation example are carried out to analyze the influence on the game equilibrium from government's rewards and penalties, and a code by VC++ is programmed to achieve the solution of this case study. The results of sensitivity analysis and calculation example are consistent. Suggestion and advice are given respectively to optimize the outcome of the game in each part of above work. We hope the work in this paper is beneficial to formulate a reasonable guide mechanism of EPP, including good government policy orientation, enterprise implementing strategy and reasonable carbon trading strategy, so as to create a good development environment for EPP.
Introduction

Background
Along with the accelerated process of industrialization and urbanization, a large amount of fossil energy has been consumed, which has caused enormous damage to the environment. The DSM （ demand side management ） aims to improve energy efficiency, save energy and reduce emissions and protect the environment. EPP (Energy efficiency power plant) is the latest form of DSM. Compared with decentralized demand-side management measures, EPPs have the characteristics of large scale, low financing cost and remarkable energy saving effect. The energy saving measures of EPP include green lighting, high-efficiency motors, frequency conversion governor, energysaving transformers, high-efficiency household appliances, refrigeration and heating equipment as well as interruptible load. Over the past 10 years, the development of EPP has achieved abundant energy conservation and emission reduction effects and formed a certain scale. For example, the State Grid Energy Research Institute of China counts that the generation capacity of EPP is 640.7 billion kWh in China of [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] [2015] , and estimates 2016-2020 is 1.3254 trillion kWh. It can reach 1.9661 trillion kWh during the Zhu et al.: An evolutionary game study on implementation of energy efficiency power plants between government and enterprise considering carbon emission right trading -700 -APPLIED ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH 17 (1) period of 2010-2020, equivalent to a reduction of 22,598 kWh in generation capacity and nearly 57 billion USD in investment compared with the conventional power plants (Du et al., 2015) . However, in the implementation process of EPP, enterprises believe that the implementation of EPP will lead to increased costs, and they are not enthusiastic about investing in EPP. The government lacks effective supervision means and incentive mechanism; Public awareness of EPP is not clear. Above problems seriously restrict the development of EPP. The reasons for the above problems lie in that the interests of the major participants are different from each other. If the interests of a single party are taken as the starting point, the optimal decision-making schemes of each party cannot be coordinated and unified, or even conflict, resulting in the failure of EPP implementation. Ultimately there is a lack of scientific game study on implementing EPP, which is also the problem to be solved in this paper.
Literature review
Thus to solve above problems, low carbon investment game analysis is a hot research topic. The game analysis in low carbon environment comes firstly from supply chain research. Du et al. (2015) conducted a game-theoretical analysis and Du et al. (2017) gave low-carbon supply policies for supply chain management. examined the influences of different game structures on the optimal decisions and performance of a low-carbon closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with price and carbon emission level dependent market demands. Liu et al. (2017) investigated the emission reduction performance for supply chain members in both single-channel and exclusive dual-channel cases. Other researches of supply chain focus on the low-carbon product selection (Meng et al., 2018; Xiao et al., 2018; He et al., 2018) carbon emission reduction Zhou and Ye, 2018 ) and low-carbon strategies (Zu al., 2018) Followed by the supply chain is the game analysis between participants in lowcarbon investment. Luo et al. (2016) developed a Stackelberg-like model i to gametheoretically analyze the decentralized decisions of the manufacturer and retailer. Gu et al. (2017) established the evolutionary game model between government and highway logistics enterprises. Wu et al. (2017) used game-based learning theory for reference and built an evolutionary model of low-carbon strategies based on the game between the government and enterprises in the context of a complex network. Zhao et al. (2017) developed the unit root test and the run test to analyze the carbon emission market of four representative cities in China. Chen et al. (2018) examined the role of co-opetition in low-carbon manufacturing.
While the above literatures do not specify what kind of low carbon behavior, so many literatures turn to discuss some kind of specific low-carbon objects, such as solar energy adoption (Varun and Ariane, 2017), low-carbon green oil port (Fan et al., 2012a, b) . However, there is a lack of game study on implementing EPPs.
Purpose of the study
While the above researches of low-carbon investment generalizes low-carbon investment of enterprise into low-carbon production, low-carbon behavior, and energy conservation and emission reduction vaguely, but not into what kind of low-carbon behavior specifically, which cannot provide more specific game strategies. There are
Introduction to evolutionary game theory
The combination of dynamic evolution and game analysis constitutes the basis of evolutionary game theory. Evolutionary game theory is based on the limited rationality of participants and it considers that the behavior adjustment of participants is a dynamic process (Ratul, 2012) . The whole system is constantly moving to the equilibrium state. When there are multiple equilibrium systems, the equilibrium state of the system is realized, which is determined by the evolutionary path of the initial state and evolution of the system.
Game behavior analysis of implementing EPP
In low-carbon economy, the government is the main body to constraint the resources and environment, which gives guidance and adjustment for enterprise implementing EPP and gives supports from the aspects of laws, regulations and policies. Enterprises are the main body to implement EPP, so they should not only undertake the important task of saving electricity, reducing emissions and protecting the environment, but also take the responsibility for enhancing the competitiveness of their products and ensuring sustainable development of themselves. Because government and enterprises pursue different goals, there is a fierce game in the process of implementing EPP inevitably. Both sides need to adjust their own game strategy according to the other side's, so as to maximize the utility and reach the game equilibrium. Therefore, the best strategy to implement EPP must be the result of multiple games and rational choices between government and enterprises.
The purpose of constructing the game model of the government and enterprise implementing EPP is to help government adopt a reasonable guidance and management mechanism, and help enterprise adopt reasonable implementing measures, which will ultimately contribute to the development of the EPPs.
Building of the evolutionary game model
Hypotheses
(1) Participants in the game The participants in this game are both local government and enterprises implementing EPP, and both have limited rational characteristics.
(2) Behavioral strategies The set of government's strategy is {H-Strict supervision, L-Lax regulation}. "Strict supervision" refers to the strict implementation of carbon emission reduction policies by local governments, timely accounting for the carbon emission of enterprises and urging enterprises to comply with carbon emission reduction constraints, in this paper, the way is namely implementing EPP.
The set of enterprise's strategy is {A-implementing EPP, N-not implementing EPP}. "Implementing EPP" refers that enterprises chose to implement EPP to fulfill their duties of supervision and carbon accounting. "Not implementing EPP" refers that enterprises for some reasons do not choose to implement EPP and result in excessive emissions.
So this game contains four pure policy strategies combinations, namely {H-Strict supervision, A-implementing EPP}, {H-Strict supervision, N-not implementing EPP}, {L-Lax regulation, A-implementing EPP} and {L-Lax regulation, N-not implementing EPP}. CC  . ④ Suppose that when enterprises' carbon emissions are within the quota, the government can gain profit g P from the emission reduction, which is related to the emission reduction quantity A DD  , including the reduction of environmental damage caused by enterprise emission reduction, environmental improvement, and the increase of public satisfaction to the government. Enterprises can benefit c P from emissions cuts, associated with emission reduction A DD  by implementing EPPs, including social image and reputation improvement, and more government policy support.
⑤ When enterprises carbon emissions are excess, the government will impose fines F on enterprises, which is related to the excess emission N DD  . The fines include both cash penalty and crackdown on those enterprises.
⑥ Assumed that the excessive emissions of enterprises will also bring losses V to local governments, related to the excess emission of enterprises.
V includes the damage to the environment by excessive carbon emissions from the enterprise, public dissatisfaction with the government due to environmental variation, and punishment from the higher level government. 
The evolutionary game model
Assuming carbon price ( p ) per unit is an exogenous variable, determined by the market. When the carbon emissions of an enterprise do not exceed the quota, the income derived from the sale of carbon emission rights will be
When the enterprise emissions are excess, it will be required to purchase the carbon emission right, and the cost is
Assuming that enterprises can meet their emissions targets by purchasing carbon credits from others, local governments will not have to bear the losses (V ) because the total amount of carbon quotas in the whole society is stable. The income function of local government and enterprises under different strategies can be obtained in Table 2 (x and y are the probability). 
N-not implementing EPP (1-y)
Local government
of strategy H and L (i.e., strict supervision and lax supervision) and the average expected groups earnings ( g U ) of local government are as below (Eqs. 1-3): 
So the replicated dynamic equation for the local government is (Eq. 4):
Similarly, the enterprises' expected benefits ( 
The replicated dynamic equation for the enterprise is (Eq. 8): 
So, (0,0), (1, 0) , (0,1), (1, 1) are the equilibrium points of evolutionary game system.
xy is also the equilibrium point. Therefore, there are totally five equilibrium points.
Model stability analysis and evolution paths
This part will analyze Jacobian matrix's determinant and trace of the equilibrium points.
Four propositions (1)- (4) Below is the prove process: In the carbon trade situation, the Jacobian matrix of this game system is (Eq. 11): (1 ) ( 1 2 
)( )
Jacobian matrix's determinant and trace of every equilibrium point can be shown in Table 3 . Table 3 . Jacobian matrix's determinant and trace of every equilibrium point
There are six situations (a)-(f) for the parameters in this game:
Analyzing the Jacobian matrix of every equilibrium point in each situation, local stability of equilibrium point in each situation can be shown in Table 4 .
Based on Table 4 , the system evolution phase diagram of each situation in Figure 1 can be shown as Figure 1 , thus the propositions (1)- (4) can be proved. Zhu et 
Figure 1. The system evolution phase diagram in each situation
Results
Model result analysis
The following conclusions can be summarized through the model construction and system evolution phase diagram.
(1) When cA a D P P    , the evolutionary stability strategy of game system is { , } LA. Point (0,1) is the only evolutionary stable point, no matter what the initial state is, the system always converges to (0,1). This suggests that the local government can only have the best interest by opting for lax regulation. The evolution of the system will converge to strategy { , } LA. This is the stable state the local government would like to see under the carbon emission trading mechanism, namely, under the conditions of lax supervision, the enterprises can consciously implement EPP. 
, there is no evolutionary stabilization strategy in game system. The evolution trend of the system depends on the initial state of the game between the two groups in Figure 1 .
    , the evolutionary stability strategy of game system is { , } HN. Point (1,0) is the only evolutionary stable point, no matter what the initial state is, the system always converges to (1, 0) . This moment the loss to local government in lax supervision is more than the regulatory scrutiny when strict supervision, but the earnings to the enterprise by excessive emissions outstrip the benefits of observing carbon emissions constraints.
Parameter sensitivity analysis result
This part will use Matlab software to simulate the impact on the stability of game equilibrium results from some important parameters in the game model.
First the six variables , , , , , N c A V C P P P D  in the replicated dynamic equation (Eq. 4) and Equation 8 are set as constants, then the impact on the probability y of enterprises implementing EPP from the probability x of government regulation is analyzed.
(1) When x = 0.2, replicated dynamic equation is simulated in Matlab, and the evolution result graph of y taking different values is shown in Figure 2a .
(2) When x = 0.8, replicated dynamic equation is simulated in Matlab, and the evolution result graph of y taking different values is shown in Figure 2b . Figure 2 shows that government's regulatory attitude will have a great impact on the game result. When the government supervises with low probability, the probability of enterprise implementing EPP will gradually decrease and eventually converge to 0. When the government regulates with high probability, the probability of enterprise implementing EPP will gradually increase and eventually converge to 1. In the second part the impact on the probability y of enterprises implement EPP from the fines F on excessive carbon emissions will be analyzed, and x = 0.5 will be set to weaken the impact of government supervision on enterprises.
(1) When F = 0.2, replicated dynamic equation is simulated in Matlab, and the evolution result graph of y taking different values is shown in Figure 3a .
(2) When F = 0.5, replicated dynamic equation is simulated in Matlab, and the evolution result graph of y taking different values is shown in Figure 3b . Figure 3 indicates the punishment strength of the government has a positive influence on the game balance. If the government chooses a large scale of punishments, it will encourage enterprises to actively implement EPP, so that the game equilibrium will evolve towards the ideal direction. If the amount of penalty for not implementing EPP is very low, it cannot affect enterprises effectively.
In the last part the impact on the probability x of local government's supervision from g P (profit of government when carbon emissions are within the quota) is analyzed, and y = 0.5 is set to weaken the impact of enterprises' decision on implementing EPP. (1) When g P =0.1, replicated dynamic equation is simulated in Matlab, and the evolution result graph of y taking different values is shown in Figure 4a .
(2) When g P =0.6, replicated dynamic equation is simulated in Matlab, and the evolution result graph of y taking different values is shown in Figure 4b .
When social positive reward value is high, regardless of the initial probability x of decision on supervision, after a long period x will gradually increase and in the long term converges to 1. This indicates that when the public has a strong awareness of environmental protection and energy conservation, and recognizes the importance of implementing EPP, the public will urge government to actively regulate enterprises that do not implement EPP, at last promoting the development of EPP.
Calculation example analysis
To verify that the model results are valid or not, this part will use a calculation example to analyze the influence on the game equilibrium from government's rewards and penalties to the enterprise implementing EPP. A case of EPP projects in Hebei Province, China is taken as sample. In this part, three kind of original data are collected in different ways:
(1) The basic information and data of the EPP project, such as project name, investment amount, annual power saving, annual carbon emission, equipment life and other information come from Hebei Demand Side Center (HBDSM).
(2) The common parameters, such as electricity market price, carbon price, rate of interest, rate of depreciation and other data are referred to recent data released by authorities.
(3) To other data needed in this calculation of the EPP project, such as gains and losses for the government when implementing EPP or not, the cost of government regulation, the carbon emission quota that the enterprise is allocated, and other data which are not easy to get, these data are assumed at a reasonable level. Zhu et al.: An evolutionary game study on implementation of energy efficiency power plants between government and enterprise considering carbon emission right trading -711 -APPLIED ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH 17 (1) Table 4 shows some important parameters in this calculation example. Assuming the government will reward enterprises according to the power saved by EPP, and the size of the reward is a certain proportion ( c r ) of the power saved. The other parameter is p r , and the government will punish enterprises according to carbon emission beyond the quota, namely, the size of the penalty is a certain proportion ( p r ) of carbon emission beyond the quota. The impact on the game equilibrium and evolution direction from government's different strategies (mainly c r and p r ) is analyzed. Because the data in this study are complex and there are multifarious index operation, so vc++ (version 6.0) is used to construct a program to achieve the solution of this case study, and the results are shown in Table 5 . According to Table 5 , when the government adopts the strategy of high reward and light penalty (increase the value of c r and keep p r steady), the value of x raises and the value of y decreases progressively, the government's expected profit raises and the enterprise's decreases progressively; When the government adopts the strategy of light reward and heavy penalty (keep c r steady, increase the value of p r ), both x and y decreases progressively, both expected profit of government and enterprise raises progressively; When the government adopts the strategy of high reward and heavy penalty (increase the value of c r and p r ), both x and y decreases progressively, the government's expected profit raises and the enterprise's keeps steady. Combined with the expectation of system evolution direction (1, 1)/ strategy {H,A}, compared the three different kinds of incentive strategy, strategy {light reward, heavy penalty} and strategy Zhu et al.: An evolutionary game study on implementation of energy efficiency power plants between government and enterprise considering carbon emission right trading - 
Discussion
In this paper three important contents are put forward: Firstly, an evolutionary game model between government and enterprise on implementing EPP considering carbon emission right trading is proposed, and the model's stability and evolution paths are analyzed.
Secondly, Matlab software is used to simulate the impact from sensitivity of some important parameters (the probability x of government regulation, fines F on excessive carbon emissions, and the profit of government when carbon emissions are within the quota).
Finally, a calculation example is carried out to analyze the influence on the game equilibrium from government's rewards and penalties. And vc++ is used to write a program (seen Appendix) to achieve the solution of this case study.
Compared to literatures (Du et al., 2015; Xiao et al., 2018) about the game study of low-carbon investment, low-carbon investment is translated into implementation of EPP, and specific research conclusions and specific recommendations are given; Compared to literatures Zhou and Ye, 2018) about the game study of carbon emission, besides the carbon emission energy savings are considered as one of the benefits of implementing EPP; Compared to literatures (Zu et al., 2018) about the study of differential game, evolutionary game analysis is focused on and the model's stability and evolution paths are analyzed; Compared to literatures (Gu et al., 2017; Wu et al., 2017) about the evolutionary game study of low carbon, the sensitivity of some important parameters is simulated and the influence on the game equilibrium from government's rewards and penalties by a calculation example are analyzed, which is consistent with the evolutionary model's conclusion.
Conclusion and suggestion
Conclusion
(1) The evolutionary game process and stability strategy of local governments and power generation enterprises are systematically analyzed under the carbon emission trading mechanism. The research found that when the expected increase earnings from enterprise's excess emissions are less than the sum of indirect profit from the carbon emission constraint and the sale of surplus carbon allowance income, excess emissions are not tempting for enterprises implementing EEP, the strategy of enterprises implementing EEP will tend to not excessive emissions, and local governments will choose a strategy of loose regulation. When the loss caused by loose local government supervision exceeds the extra cost of the strict supervision, and the expected increased earnings in excess emission from enterprises implementing EEP is greater than the sum of the income from the carbon emission constraint and the sales of the carbon allowance, and less than the sum of income from the carbon emission constrain, income from the sale of carbon allowances and purchase of carbon allowances in excess emissions, the game between local governments and enterprises implementing EEP shows a periodic behavior pattern. Zhu et al.: An evolutionary game study on implementation of energy efficiency power plants between government and enterprise considering carbon emission right trading -714 -APPLIED ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH 17 (1) (2) The different influences of the typical variables on the evolution process of the game are discussed through simulation. It is found that whether the regulatory action chosen by government is positive has a significant impact on the decision-making of the enterprise. The appropriate reward and punishment mechanism of the government will guide the enterprises to choose to product with a low-carbon production methods. And the public's low carbon awareness will also have a positive impact on the government's choice of regulatory actions.
Suggestion
The impact of different initial states and different factors on enterprises emission reduction strategies was analyzed, and policy recommendations were made for local governments. This paper proposes that local governments can promote carbon emissions from enterprises implementing EEP within carbon allowance. The measures that can be taken are to increase incentives for actively complying with carbonconstrained emission reduction enterprises, to appropriately increase the carbon emission trading price of the carbon market, to reduce the cost difference between strict and loose local government supervision, and to strengthen the supervision of the government by public. In the end, the control objectives of the total amount of social carbon emissions will be achieved.
